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Abstract
The paper proposes a representation of the subsumption re-
lation and of count as conditional in the context of argument
ontologies. Starting from the weaker notion of classification
represented by the subsumption relation towards the stronger
notion of count as, we show how to reason whether an argu-
ment is accepted in ontologies involving these two notions.
We adopt the methodology of meta-argumentation in order
to model the design decisions. Argumentation, being able to
handle contradictory information, is proposed as technique to
reason about count as for ontology interoperability.
Introduction
The notion of count as comes from constitutive norms,
where “X counts as Y in the context of C” is a stan-
dard representation in legal ontologies. Count as rela-
tions may hold between brute and institutional facts, but
also between actions or processes and propositions, and
so on. Constitutive norms, introduced by (Searle 1969;
1995), define that something counts as something else for
a given institution. Searle claims about this kind of norms:
“The activity of playing chess is constituted by action in
accordance with these rules. The institutions of marriage,
money, and promising are like the institutions of baseball
and chess in that they are systems of such constitutive rules
or conventions”. In the context of constitutive norms, dif-
ferent interpretations of the notion of count as have been
provided in the literature. On the one hand, count as is seen
as a form of classification, in which the concept X is a sub-
concept of Y (Sartor 2006). On the other hand, count as
is seen as a more complex notion in which the context C
plays an important role since the classification would not
hold without the normative system stating it (Grossi, Meyer,
and Dignum 2008). In this paper, we refer to the first kind
of count as as classification or subsumption relation and to
the second one as count as relation.
The combining of the research areas of argumentation
theory and the semantic web has produced significant con-
tributions in the last years towards the progress of theoretical
and pragmatical aspects concerning reasoning about ontolo-
gies (Dix et al. 2009). For example, the ontology mapping,
identifying how terms of one ontology are related to terms in
another ontology is an important issue. In legal ontologies,
since normative systems change over time, it becomes nec-
essary to handle the evolution of the ontologies. Argumen-
tation theory provides a flexible way to compute inferences,
stating explicitly the reasons behind these inferences (Dix et
al. 2009).
In this paper, we address the following research question:
• How to reason about subsumption and count as condi-
tional in argument ontologies?
We reason about subsumption and count as such that
the acceptance of one argument is a reason to accept an-
other argument. Note that this is the opposite of Dung’s
theory (Dung 1995), where the attack relation represents
a negative relation and the acceptance of one argument
is a reason to reject another argument. In (Boella et al.
2009), the methodology of meta-argumentation to model ar-
gument ontologies is proposed. The methodology of meta-
argumentation instantiates Dung’s abstract argumentation
theory with an extended argumentation theory. We apply
Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation to itself by instan-
tiating Dung’s abstract arguments with meta-arguments. Ar-
guments are seen as abstract entities as in classical (Dung
1995) and we identify them with the concepts of the on-
tology. Moreover, we reason about the consequences of a
second-order attack on the count as relation itself. The count
as relation is attacked by meta-arguments meaning that in
another normative system, the count as relation does not
hold. In meta-argumentation every additional structure is
represented in terms of the two basic notions of arguments
and attack relations, then we detect what arguments are ac-
ceptable and what inferences are no more actual.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the methodology of meta-argumentation. In section 3, the
subsumption relation and count as conditional are modeled
using meta-argumentation. Related work and conclusions
end the paper.
Meta-Argumentation Methodology
Argumentation is the process by which arguments are con-
structed and handled. Thus argumentation means that
arguments are compared, evaluated in some respect and
judged in order to establish whether any of them are war-
ranted (Besnard and Hunter 2009). There are, at the higher
level, two ways to formalize a set of arguments and their re-
lationships, abstract argumentation and logical argumenta-
tion. Abstract argumentation has been introduced by (Dung
1995) and it names the arguments without describing them
and represents that an argument is attacked by another one.
Logical argumentation (Prakken, Reed, and Walton 2003)
is a framework in which more details about the arguments
are considered. In this paper, we adopt the methodology of
meta-argumentation as modeling technique for abstract ar-
gumentation.
When Dung’s theory of abstract argumentation cannot be
applied directly, there are two alternative methodologies to
model argumentation: instantiating abstract arguments or
extending Dung’s framework. (Boella et al. 2009) argue
that the dilemma of choosing among these two alternatives
can be resolved using the meta-argumentation methodology,
because it is a merger between the methodology of instan-
tiating abstract arguments on the one hand, and extending
argumentation frameworks on the other hand. We can in-
stantiate Dung’s theory with meta-arguments, such that we
use Dung’s theory to reason about itself.
Figure 1: The meta-argumentation methodology.
Following similar proposals in the recent literature
as (Modgil 2009), we use X and Y meta-arguments to
model second and higher order attacks. Table 1 summa-
rizes the notation of meta-argumentation used in this paper.
Our meta-argumentation approach is a particular way to de-
fine mappings from argumentation frameworks to extended
argumentation frameworks: the arguments are interpreted
as meta-arguments, of which some are mapped to “argu-
ment a is acceptable” where a is an abstract argument from
the extended argumentation framework EAF . The meta-
argumentation methodology is visualized in Figure 1. The
function f assigns to each argument a in the EAF , an argu-
ment “argument a is acceptable” in the basic argumentation
framework. We use Dung’s acceptance functions E to find
functions E ′ between extended argumentation frameworks
EAF and acceptable arguments AA′. This transformation
function consists of two parts: a function f−1 transforms an
argumentation framework AF to an EAF , and a function
g transforms the accepted arguments of the basic argumen-
tation framework into acceptable arguments of the EAF s.
Summarizing E ′ = {(f−1(a), g(b)) | (a, b) ∈ E}.
The first step of our approach is to define the set of ex-
tended argumentation frameworks. The second step consists
in defining flattening algorithms as a function from this set
of EAF s to the set of all basic argumentation frameworks:
NOTATION MEANING
U universe of all generated arguments
A ⊂ U a finite set of arguments
a, b, c, ... ∈ A elements of A
→ binary relation on A representing attack
MU universe of all meta-arguments
accept(a) “argument a is acceptable”
MA a set of meta-arguments
7−→ a relation on MA
EAF an extended AF
EAF a set of possible EAF
f function from EAF to AF
AF a pair of A and→
AF a set of possible AF
E mapping from 〈A,→〉 to sets of subsets of A
g function from accepted MA to accepted A
⇒ binary relation on A representing counts-as
X,Y meta-arguments for attack
Table 1: Notation used in the paper.
f : EAF → AF . The flattening defines the attack in the
basic argumentation framework as the intersection of the at-
tack and the preference relation of the extended argumenta-
tion framework. Definition 1 provides an example of how
turning a second-order argumentation framework, which is
an extended argumentation framework where attacks of at-
tacks are allowed, into a meta-argumentation framework.
The universe of meta-arguments is MU = {accept(a) |
a ∈ U} ∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ U}, and the flattening func-
tion f is given by f(EAF ) = 〈MA, 7−→〉. Given an ac-
ceptance function E for basic argumentation, the extensions
of accepted arguments of an extended argumentation frame-
work are given by E ′(EAF ) = g(E(f(EAF ))).
Definition 1 Given an extended argumentation framework
EAF = 〈A,→,→2〉 where A ⊆ U is a set of arguments,
→⊆ A×A is a binary relation, and→2 is a binary relation
on (A∪ →)× →, the set of meta-arguments is MA ⊆ MU
is
{accept(a) | a ∈ A} ∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ A}
and 7−→⊆MA×MA is a binary relation on MA such that
accept(a) 7−→ Xa,b, Xa,b 7−→ Ya,b, Ya,b 7−→ accept(b)
if and only if a→ b,
accept(a) 7−→ Xa,Yb,c , Xa,Yb,c 7−→ Ya,Yb,c ,
Ya,Yb,c 7−→ Yb,c if and only if a→2 (b→ c),
Ya,b 7−→ Yc,d if and only if (a→ b)→2 (c→ d)
.
The advantage in adopting the meta-argumentation
methodology consists in the possibility to add new interac-
tions between the arguments, as second-order attacks, the
subsumption and the count as relations, without extending
Dung’s framework. This allows us to reuse all Dung’s prin-
ciples, properties and algorithms. For a further discussion
about meta-argumentation, see (Boella, van der Torre, and
Villata 2009; Boella et al. 2009).
Subsumption and count as conditional
Count as relation is a set of constraints within any institu-
tion according to which certain states of affairs of a given
type count as, or are to be classified as, states of affairs of
another given type (Jones and Sergot 1996). One of the
simpler examples of count as conditional is “conveyances
transporting people or goods count as vehicles in the con-
text of normative system C”. In this paper, we are interested
in more argument-based examples which explicitly state the
link with constitutive norms. Even when arguments are ab-
stract, we may still assume that there is an ontology of argu-
ments, for example when one argument is a sub-argument of
a longer argument. Count as/subsumption relations among
arguments are used to describe such an ontology, without
describing the internal structure of the arguments which rep-
resent the notions of the ontology. For example:
• The argument that “agent A accepts argument b” is sub-
sumed by an argument that “agent A knows argument b”.
• The argument for “an insurer proposes a modification of
an insurance contracts but the insuree does not answer”
counts as “the insuree accepts such a modification” in the
context of the Italian Civil Law but the same does not hold
for the USA Civil Law (Sartor 2006).
• The argument “breaking the seal of a disk envelope”
counts as the argument “accepting all the terms of the
disk’s license” (Sartor 2006).
In logical argumentation, the internal structure of the ar-
guments is known, then such a count as/subsumption rela-
tion among arguments can be partly derived from this in-
ternal structure. For example, if an argument is represented
by a propositional formula, then an argument a counts as/is
subsumed by an argument b if the propositional sentence as-
sociated with argument a implies the propositional sentence
associated with argument b. However, we do not consider
such instantiations in this paper, and restrict our discussion
to the abstract level.
Semantics (without attacks on count as)
We propose the following meaning for a count as relation
among arguments: if argument a counts as an argument b,
then argument a cannot be accepted without argument b be-
ing accepted too. In other words, if we have both that argu-
ment a counts as argument b, and argument a is accepted,
then we are forced to accept argument b too. In our seman-
tics, we have that argument a is seen as a sub-concept of
argument b. For the examples above, our semantics gives
the following interpretation to the count as/subsumption re-
lation:
• If you accept the argument that “agent A accepts argu-
ment b” then you should also accept the argument that
“agent A knows argument b”.
• If you accept the argument for “no answer of the insuree
about a modification of an insurance contract” then you
should also accept the argument which stands for “accep-
tance of the insurance modification”.
• If you accept the argument for “breaking the seal of a disk
envelope” then you should also accept the argument for
“accepting all the terms of the following license”.
This semantics makes it explicit that “argument a counts
as/is subsumed by argument b” is intuitively a stronger no-
tion than “argument a supports argument b”, because if argu-
ment a supports argument b and there is another argument c
such that argument c attacks argument b, then we may have
that argument a is accepted without argument b being ac-
cepted. In such a case, intuitively, argument a supports argu-
ment b, but the support was not strong enough for argument
b to be accepted too (Amgoud et al. 2008). In the case of
count as conditional, if argument a counts as argument b and
argument a is accepted, then argument b will be accepted
too, regardless of other attacks on argument b. The only way
to have argument a accepted without accepting argument b is
to attack the count as/subsumption relation between the two
arguments, but that is an issue we defer to the next section.
There are some logical properties such count as relation
has to obey. In particular, the following transitivity prop-
erty: if a counts as b and b counts as c, then a counts as c.
This follows from the semantics: if accepting b implies that
c must be accepted, and accepting a implies that b must be
accepted, then accepting a implies that c must be accepted.
For example, if “secretary’s signature” counts as “boss’s sig-
nature” and “boss’s signature” counts as “providing a valid
claim for expenses” then also “secretary’s signature” counts
as “providing a valid claim for expenses”. This logical con-
sequence has been highlighted by (Jones and Sergot 1996)
in the context of deontic and action logics.
There are two fundamental logical principles which fol-
low from this semantics:
1. If a counts as b and b attacks c, then a attacks c. For
example, if the argument “agent A knows argument b”
attacks the argument that “agent A does not know any-
thing”, then “agent A accepts argument b” also attacks the
argument that “agent A does not know anything”. Like-
wise if “accepting all the terms of disks’ license” attacks
“pirate disks do not have license” then “breaking the seal
of a disk envelope” attacks that “pirate disks do not have
license” too.
2. If a counts as b and c attacks b, then c attacks a. For ex-
ample, if the argument “agent A knows only arguments
c and d” attacks the argument that “agent A knows argu-
ment b”, then “agent A knows only arguments c and d”
also attacks the argument that “agent A accepts argument
b”. Likewise if “not visualizing e-Bay Agreement and
Privacy Policy in home page” attacks “accepting the e-
Bay Agreement and Privacy Policy” then you should also
accept that “not visualizing e-Bay Agreement and Privacy
Policy in home page” attacks “using e-Bay website”.
The following principles are not valid:
3. If c attacks a and a counts as b, then c attacks b. For ex-
ample, if “breaking the seal of a disk envelope” counts as
“accepting all the terms of the disk license” and “unstick-
ing the seal of a disk envelope” attacks “breaking the seal
of a disk envelope”, then you should also accept that “un-
sticking the seal of a disk envelope” attacks “accepting all
the terms of the disk license” but this principle does not
hold.
4. If a counts as b and a attacks c, then b attacks c. For
example, if “using e-Bay website” counts as “accept-
ing the e-Bay Agreement and Privacy Policy” and “using
e-Bay website” attacks “e-Bay website is not protected
against hackers” then you should also accept that “ac-
cepting the e-Bay Agreement and Privacy Policy” attacks
“e-Bay website is not protected against hackers” but this
principle does not hold.
This list of valid and invalid properties raises two ques-
tions. First, is there another reason, besides the intuition for
these examples, why these principles are valid or invalid?
Second, even more ambitiously, what is the set of all the
valid principles? To answer these questions, we turn to the
logic of argumentation (Boella, Hulstijn, and van der Torre
2006). We can represent that “a attacks b” by “accept(a)
implies not accept(b)” and “a counts as/is subsumed by b”
by “accept(a) implies accept(b)”, but the question is which
kind of implication is used here. For count as/subsumption
relation we can use the material implication ⊃ from classi-
cal logic, following the example of (Jones and Sergot 1996)
where → represents the material conditional of “if A then
B”, A → B. Concerning the attack relation, we cannot use
material implication, because, from the property of contra-
position, it would follow from a attacks b that b attacks a:
(accept(a) ⊃ ¬accept(b)) ⊃ (accept(b) ⊃ ¬accept(a)).
Thus we use a weaker kind of implication > here for rep-
resenting the attack relation. So we have the transitiv-
ity relation: (accept(a) ⊃ accept(b)) ∧ (accept(b) ⊃
accept(c)) ⊃ (accept(a) ⊃ accept(c)) and the fundamen-
tal properties that a counts as/is subsumed by b and b attacks
c, then a attacks c: (accept(a) ⊃ accept(b)) ∧ accept(b) >
¬accept(c)) ⊃ (accept(a) > ¬accept(c)) and if a counts
as/is subsumed by b and c attacks b, then c attacks a:
(accept(a) ⊃ accept(b)) ∧ (accept(c) > ¬accept(b)) ⊃
(accept(c) > ¬accept(a)) Likewise, the logic of argu-
mentation shows why the other principles are invalid, such
as if c attacks a and a counts as/is subsumed by b, then
c attacks b: (accept(c) > ¬accept(a)) ∧ (accept(a) ⊃
accept(b)) ⊃ (accept(c) > ¬accept(b)) and if a counts
as/is subsumed by b and a attacks c, then b attacks c:
(accept(a) > ¬accept(c)) ∧ (accept(a) ⊃ accept(b)) ⊃
(accept(b) > ¬accept(c)).
In this first part of the paper we have introduced the
weaker form of count as conditional which is similar to sub-
sumption relation. This weaker notion of count as has been
introduced by (Sartor 2006). (Grossi, Meyer, and Dignum
2008) provide a formal analysis about the many faces of
count as, highlighting that count as statements are classifi-
cations which hold with respect to a context but which does
not hold with respect to all situations. Let us consider again
the example about conveyance vehicles. Since bike is a sub-
concept of the concept conveyance vehicle transporting peo-
ple or goods, then we have that in the context of normative
system C, bikes count as vehicles. From now on, we refer to
classificatory count as with the term subsumption and to the
count as with a context with the term count as. We restrict
the conditional to a set of arguments. The logical principles
hold only if they refer to arguments in the same context. For
example, the argument “an insurer proposes a modification
of an insurance contracts but the insuree does not answer”
counts as “the insuree accepts the insurance modification”
in the context C, Italian Civil Law, but the same count as
does not hold in context D, USA Civil Law (Sartor 2006).
Given an argumentation framework together with a set
of count as conditionals, we can extend the argumentation
framework using the logical principles above. We define an
extended argumentation framework EAF = 〈A,→,⇒C〉
where ⇒C designates the notion of count as relation we
seek to capture. The attack relations in meta-argumentation
are defined as in Definition 1. The flattening function f is
given by f(EAF ) = 〈MA, 7−→〉 and the extensions of ac-
cepted arguments of this extended argumentation framework
are given by E ′(EAF ) = g(E(f(EAF ))).
Definition 2 Let EAF = 〈A,→,⇒C〉 be an extended ar-
gumentation framework where A is the set of arguments,
→⊆ A × A is a binary attack relation and ⇒C⊆ A × A
is a binary subsumption relation. This EAF is a meta-
argumentation framework 〈MA, 7−→〉 where:
• MA ⊆MU is a finite set of meta-arguments such that
{accept(a) | a ∈ A} ∪ {Xa,b, Ya,b | a, b ∈ A};
• 7−→⊆ MA × MA is relation on meta-arguments such
that if (a⇒C b) ∈⇒C , then:
– if (c→ b) ∈7−→ then (c→ a) ∈7−→
– if (b→ c) ∈7−→ then (a→ c) ∈7−→
– if (c→ a) ∈7−→ then (c→ b) /∈7−→
– if (a→ c) ∈7−→ then (b→ c) /∈7−→
Definition 2 represents an extended argumentation frame-
work in which it is introduced the count as relation. The
definition explains what attacks arise from a count as rela-
tion like a ⇒C b and what attacks cannot be added due to
the count as relation. Let us consider the issue of ontology
change. Suppose one agent has an ontology of arguments,
then it adds a new argument to the ontology. The result is
that all count as relations and their consequent attack re-
lations have to be reconsidered again to see which attacks
must be added or deleted now. Let us consider again the
example about e-Bay Privacy Policy. We have that “using
e-Bay website” (argument a) counts as “accepting the e-Bay
Agreement and Privacy Policy” (argument b) in context Ital-
ian Law and “not visualizing e-Bay Agreement and Privacy
Policy in home page” (argument c) attacks “accepting the
e-Bay Agreement and Privacy Policy” (b) and “using e-Bay
website” (a) attacks “e-Bay website is not protected against
hackers” (argument d). Then, according to principle 2 and
principle 4, we have that c → a but only a → d. If we
add a new argument e, attacking argument c, not only argu-
ment b is supported by this new argument but argument a is
supported by e, too.
Now we present how to model these examples with the
meta-argumentation modeling. In Figure 2, we have a count
as/subsumption relation between two arguments and first-
A B C
D
counts as
subsumption
A B C
D
counts as
subsumption
accept(d) Xd,Yb,c
Yb,c accept(c)
Ya,cXa,c
Xb,caccept(b)Ya,bXa,baccept(a)
Yd,Yb,c accept(d) Xd,Yc,b
Xc,b accept(c)
Xc,aYc,a
Yc,baccept(b)Ya,bXa,baccept(a)
Yd,Yc,b
(a) (b)
Attack relations
Attack relations due
to count as\subsumption
Second-order attack 
relations
Meta-arguments added
due to second-order attack
Accepted meta-arguments
Not accepted meta-arguments
Figure 2: Example of ontology evolution with a subsumption relation.
and second-order attacks among other arguments. Defini-
tion 2 can be specified by Definition 3 which explains what
meta-arguments have to be related to each other in order to
represent the count as/subsumption relation.
Definition 3 We say that argument a counts as argument
b, a ⇒C b, and that argument c attacks argument b (c is
attacked by argument b) with a, b ∈ A if for all arguments
c ∈ A, we have Yb,c attacks Xa,c (Yc,b attacks Xc,a).
Algorithm 1 describes how to build the meta-
argumentation network in these cases. Example 1
introduces the meta-argumentation modeling for the sub-
sumption relation and the ontology change in case of
additional attacks.
Example 1 Figure 2.a presents the changes in the argument
ontology due to an attack from argument b, subsuming argu-
ment a, to argument c. This attack brings to the addition
of another attack from argument a to argument c, as stated
before. What happens if another argument d attacks the at-
tack between b and c? Intuitively, the ontology changes are
that the attack of argument d attacks also the attack from
argument a to argument c, due to the subsumption relation.
The subsumption relation is represented by means of
an attack from meta-argument Xa,b to meta-argument Ya,b
and another attack from meta-argument Ya,b to meta argu-
ment “b is acceptable”. The advantage brought by meta-
argumentation consists in representing every extended argu-
mentation framework by means of a classical Dung’s frame-
work composed only by arguments and attack relations. The
attack from b to c “activates” the attack from a to c due to
the subsumption relation. Meta-argument Yb,c attacks meta-
argument Xa,c in order to “activate” the attack from a to c
constrained to the activation of the attack from b to c (meta-
argument Yb,c has to be accepted in order to make accepted
also meta-argument Ya,c). The set of acceptable arguments
is {a, b}. If d attacks the attack between b and c, then the at-
tack from a to c has to be deleted too. This is modeled by an
attack from meta-argument d to meta-argument Yd,Yb,c and
this attack involves also the attack from a to c, which is now
made out. The set of acceptable arguments is {a, b, c, d}.
Let us consider now the example of Figure 2.b described
in Example 2.
Example 2 Figure 2.b presents the ontology change due to
an attack from an argument c to argument b given that argu-
ment a is subsumed by b. This means that argument c attacks
also argument a. This attack, then, should be deleted if an-
other attack from argument d to the attack c → b is raised,
due to the subsumption relation. In the meta-argumentation
modeling, the attack from c to b is characterized by meta-
argument Yc,b. This meta-argument attacks meta-argument
Xc,a, in order to “activate” the attack from argument c to
argument a as a consequence of the activation of the at-
tack from c to b. The set of acceptable arguments is {c}.
If argument d attacks the attack from argument c to argu-
ment b then also the attack from argument c to argument a
has to be attacked. This is modeled in the following way:
meta-argument Yd,Yc,b attacks meta-argument Yc,b, making
it not acceptable. The changes occurring in the arguments
ontology thanks to this “deactivation” are that also meta-
argument Yc,a is made not accepted, deleting in this way the
attack from argument c to argument a. The set of acceptable
arguments is {a, b, c, d}.
Semantics (with attacks on count as)
Thus far, we analyzed the cases in which the arguments in-
volved in a count as/subsumption relation are attacked or
attacks other arguments. The difference between the clas-
sificatory count as (here called subsumption) and the count
as relation related to constitutive norms has to be underlined
when you consider an attack on the count as relation itself.
The attack on the count as relation is strictly related to the
notion of context. Given that argument a counts as argu-
ment b in normative system Γ then what happens if in the
same legal argument ontology are added notions from nor-
mative system Θ in which the count as relation between a
and b does not exist? We represent the normative system Θ
by means of a meta-argument attacking the count as relation.
This attack leads to a change in the ontology as we discuss
in the following examples.
A B C
D
counts as A B C
D
counts as
Xb,d
Ya,baccept(a) Xa,b accept(b) accept(c)Yb,cXb,c
Xa,c Xc,d Yc,dYa,c
Y(Ya,b,Xa,d)X(Ya,b,Xa,d)
accept(d)Ya,dXa,dYb,d Xb,d
Ya,baccept(a) Xa,b accept(b) accept(c)Xc,bYc,b
Xc,a Xc,d Yc,dYc,a
Y(Ya,b,Xa,d)X(Ya,b,Xa,d)
accept(d)Ya,dXa,dYb,d
CTX1
CTX2 CTX2
CTX1
(a) (b)
Figure 3: Example of attack from an argument to a count as relation.
We say that argument a counts as argument b in context
CTX1 and argument d of context CTX2 attacks the count
as relation. The ontology changes are propagated to all the
arguments involved in the count as relation. Algorithm 1
provides the procedural way to change the ontology due to
an attack on the count as relation.
Example 3 illustrates the evolution of the arguments on-
tology due to an attack on the count as relation.
Example 3 Figure 3 (where not all the attack relations
use meta-arguments for clarity of the figure) introduces the
changes occurring in the ontology when an attack on a count
as relation is fired. If argument a counts as argument b and
argument c attacks argument b and argument d attacks the
count as relation, the link between the attack relations c→ b
and c → a should be deleted. If argument a counts as ar-
gument b and argument b attacks argument c and argument
d attacks the count as relation, the connection between the
attack relations b→ c and a→ c should be deleted.
In the meta-argumentation modeling of Figure 3.a, meta-
argument Ya,c which represents the attack from a to c is
attacked by meta-argument Xc,d, representing the new ar-
gument d. Algorithm 1 provides only this situation and not
the following one in which c attacks b, depicted anyway in
Figure 3, due to space constraints. The set of acceptable
arguments is {a, b, d}. Conversely, in Figure 3.b, argument
d attacks the count as relation, thus the connection between
the attack from c to b and the attack from c to a does not hold
anymore. Meta-argument Xc,d attacks meta-argument Yc,a
which represents the attack from argument c to argument a.
This allows argument a to be in the extension of this argu-
mentation framework where the set of acceptable arguments
is {a, c, d}.
It remains the open question: Can a count as/subsumption
relation attack an argument? From our point of view,
it would be possible. This additional kind of attack will
change all the cases considered above. For example, if argu-
Input: 〈A,→,⇒C〉
Output: 〈MA, 7−→〉
forall a× b ∈⇒C do1
add(Xa,b, Ya,b);2
newAttack(Xa,b, Ya,b);3
newAttack(Ya,b, accept(b));4
end5
forall c× b ∈→ with c ∈ A, a× b ∈⇒C do6
add(Xc,b, Yc,b, Xc,a, Yc,a); newAttack(accept(c), Xc,b);7
newAttack(Xc,b, Yc,b); newAttack(Yc,b, accept(b));8
newAttack(Xc,a, Yc,a); newAttack(Yc,a, accept(a));9
newAttack(Yc,b, Xc,a);10
end11
forall b× c ∈→ with c ∈ A, a× b ∈⇒C do12
add(Xb,c, Yb,c, Xa,c, Ya,c); newAttack(accept(b), Xb,c);13
newAttack(Xb,c, Yb,c); newAttack(Yb,c, accept(c));14
newAttack(Xa,c, Ya,c); newAttack(Ya,c, accept(c));15
newAttack(Yb,c, Xa,c);16
end17
forall d× (a× b) ∈→, b× c ∈→ with d, c ∈ A, a× b ∈⇒C18
do
add(Xa,d, Ya,d, Xb,d, Yb,d, Xc,d, Yc,d, XYa,b,Xa,d , YYa,b,Xa,d );19
newAttack(Xa,d, Ya,d); newAttack(Ya,d, accept(d));
newAttack(Xb,d, Yb,d); newAttack(Yb,d, accept(d));
newAttack(Xc,d, Yc,d); newAttack(Yc,d, accept(d));
newAttack(Xc,d, Ya,c); newAttack(Yb,d, Xa,d);
newAttack(Ya,b, XYa,b,Xa,d );
newAttack(XYa,b,Xa,d , YYa,b,Xa,d );
newAttack(YYa,b,Xa,d , Xa,d);
newAttack(accept(d), YYa,b,Xa,d )
end20
Algorithm 1: COUNTAS ATTACK
Figure 4: Algorithm for count as in meta-argumentation.
ment a counts as/is subsumed by argument b and the count
as/subsumption relation is attacked by argument d, the at-
tack from the count as/subsumption relation to argument c
does not hold thus the extension would be {a, b, c, d}. The
analysis and representation of this kind of attack in meta-
argumentation is left for future research.
Related work
A logical analysis of constitutive rules and counts-as con-
nections is provided by (Jones and Sergot 1996) where the
authors introduce a conditional connective intended to cap-
ture the consequence relation implicit in statements of the
form: according to the constraints of institution a, the per-
formance of some action x by agent i counts as a means
of creating the state of affairs y. This new connective fa-
cilitates the analysis of a number of notions crucial to the
understanding of organised interaction in institutions, such
as authorization and delegation. (Jones and Sergot 1996)’s
characterization of count as has been criticized by (Gelati et
al. 2002) where, rather then introducing a separate logic for
the counts-as connection relativised to the particular insti-
tution under consideration, the authors use one conditional
operator to express any normative connections or constants,
in any institutions. (Grossi, Meyer, and Dignum 2008) de-
fine three notions of count as conditional. The first kind
of count as is called classificatory count as and it is treated
in a way similar to the subsumption relation we analyze in
this paper. The second and the third kind of count as rela-
tion are called proper contextual classification and constitu-
tive count as, respectively. In this paper, we do no distin-
guish among these two kinds of count as, considering only a
kind of count as relation with the introduction of the context
CTX . A different perspective is provided by (Sartor 2006)
who presents, among a set of other legal concepts, the notion
of count as conditional as all such conditionals which deter-
mine the constitution of certain non-natural entities such as
states of affairs, events and so on. The count as relation may
be viewed, according to (Sartor 2006) as subsuming only the
notions of non-deontic state and event emergence, according
to our definition of subsumption relation. In (Amgoud et al.
2008), Dung’s argumentation framework is extended with
a new kind of binary relation representing support. At the
meta level, they have arguments in favor of other arguments,
i.e., the support relation, and also arguments against other
arguments, i.e., the defeat relation.
Conclusions
We introduce the notions of count as and subsumption in the
context of legal argument ontologies looking not only at the
representation of these new relations among arguments but
analyzing also the consequences of attacks to a count as rela-
tion by an argument representing the fact that the count as re-
lation does not hold in another normative system. Given that
argument a counts as argument b, we highlight how to model
the fact that another argument c attacks b or b attacks c. The
ontology changes due to these kinds of attacks are described.
The advantage in using argumentation theory for legal on-
tologies dynamics consists in having a flexible and compact
way to compute inferences which does not hide the reasons
behind these inferences. Moreover, we represent subsump-
tion and count as without providing an extended argumenta-
tion framework as done by (Amgoud et al. 2008) for support
but using the methodology of meta-argumentation which en-
ables us to represent also these notions under the form of a
Dung’s framework.
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